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CORRESPONDENCE 
Three Mistakes About Interpretation 
Paul Campos* 
The single most important word in modem constitutional theory is 
"interpretation." The single most confusing word in modem constitu-
tional theory is "interpretation." What accounts for this unhappy 
state of affairs? 
The following passage appears in Barry Friedman's recent contri-
bution to the unending debate concerning the legitimacy of judicial 
review: 
The Constitution has evolved far more outside Article V than within it. 
Interpretations of constitutional clauses have undergone sea changes 
from generation to generation, far outstripping the consequence of many 
explicitly worded amendments. Obvious examples abound: the Com-
merce Clause, the Contracts Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the Equal 
Protection Clause, and so on. One seriously wonders if the Constitution 
would have endured absent language spacious enough to accommodate 
such change. 
Because the Constitution is spacious, no single offered interpretation 
of the text is likely to be accepted as correct now and for all time. . . . As 
disagreement occurs, the document will take on new meanings. 
Nor is the lack of finality necessarily a bad thing. . . . In reality, the 
process of constitutional interpretation is dynamic, not static. . . . More-
over, such dynamism is critical to the success of the venture. Judges too 
are human, and judges get things wrong .... 
Finality would curtail the evolution of our Constitution; dynamism 
encourages it. Constitutional meaning changes because people disagree 
about what the text means. Dynamism is to be encouraged, for the dy-
namic process helps formulate the interpretation of our fundamental 
charter. 1 
This passage makes certain assertions that have achieved the status 
of axioms among many contemporary constitutional law scholars and 
that are central to Friedman's defense of judicial review. Three of 
these assertions are particularly important in regard to questions of 
constitutional interpretation: (1) the meaning of the constitutional 
text has changed and continues to change; (2) disagreements about the 
meaning of the text cause these changes; and (3) these disagreements 
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. A.B. 1982, M.A. 1983, J.D. 
1989, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 651-52 (1993). 
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are desirable because judges sometimes make interpretive errors, and 
disagreement creates the opportunity to replace erroneous interpreta-
tions with correct ones. 
I will try to show that these assertions, as well as others that are 
but rephrasings of the same basic ideas, are not the common sense 
truths that so many constitutional theorists assume them to be, but are 
instead the products of an extraordinarily confused and ultimately in-
coherent set of assumptions regarding the interpretation of language. 2 
I. AsSERTION NUMBER ONE: THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT HAS CHANGED AND CONTINUES 
To CHANGE. 
What truth conditions must hold in order to give this claim a mea-
sure of plausibility? First, the interpreter of the text must dispense 
with any notion that the intentions of its author(s) determine the 
meaning of a text. The assertion that a text means what its author 
intends it to mean leads to the conclusion that the text's meaning can-
not change unless and until the text has a new author. Yet if the text 
acquires a new author, and the interpreter holds the text to mean what 
its new author intends it to mean, then it is simply arbitrary to claim 
that one is dealing with one and the same text. 3 
I can clarify this point with an example. Suppose my wife leaves a 
note in our mailbox reading "Meet me at the usual place at noon," and 
that my colleague Bob's friend Jane leaves a verbally identical note in 
his mailbox. No one would suppose that my wife's note means the 
same thing as Jane's verbally identical message. It would be just as 
peculiar to suppose that the meaning of my wife's text had changed 
when it was employed by Jane. Obviously, Jane has used the same 
linguistic signs to signify a different message, and therefore she has, 
according to an intentionalist account of textual interpretation, neces-
sarily created a different text. 
It follows that the meaning of the constitutional text can change 
only if something other than the authors' intentions generates that 
2. For an account of what textual interpretation must always in fact consist, see Paul Cam-
pos, Against Constitutional Theory, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 279 (1992) [hereinafter, Campos, 
Against Constitutional Theory]; Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and 
the Autonomous Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1065 (1993) [hereinafter Campos, That Obscure 
Object of Desire]. 
3. Supplying old texts with new authors is becoming a common methodological recommen-
dation in contemporary legal theory. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpre-
tation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988) (statutes should be interpreted in a present-minded fashion, 
as if they had been enacted recently); Guyora Binder, Did the Slaves Author the Thirteenth 
Amendment? An Essay in Redemptive History, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (forthcoming 1993) (ar-
guing that the Thirteenth Amendment should be read as if the slaves themselves had written it). 
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meaning. Therefore, even if the interpreter is willing to jettison the 
original authors and replace them with someone else, the new au-
thor(s) would, from an intentionalist perspective, generate a new text, 
even if that text should remain verbally identical with the text it 
replaces. 
Another important consequence that flows from the claim that the 
constitutional text's meaning changes is that the interpreter cannot 
claim that textual meaning is determined by some realist ontology that 
equates textual meaning with the text's supposed capacity to reflect 
ultimate moral truths. In other words, the true knowledge held by -
(fill in god-term with appropriate signifier)4 - concerning the ultimate 
morality of abortion, or capital punishment, or flag desecration laws 
would be irrelevant to the question of how the constitutional text's 
meaning changes in regard to these or any other issues. For unless 
God or the Equivalent changes His mind as to what constitutes moral 
truth, it would make no sense, according to a moral realist account of 
interpretation, to claim that the meaning of the constitutional text ever 
changes in regard to the moral issues with which that text deals. 
Of course, neither of these truth conditions will prove in any sense 
troubling to the typical progressive constitutional law theorist. It is by 
now second nature for such persons to deride the absurd notion that 
the Constitution's text means what its authors intended it to mean.5 
And we can be fairly certain that even fewer bien pensants are willing 
to join such natural law theorists as Michael Moore and Heidi Hurd in 
the Platonic affirmation that nature is but a spume that plays upon a 
ghostly paradigm of things. 6 
But this response only leaves the fundamental question unan-
swered. If neither the author's intent nor the actual content of moral 
reality provides us with the appropriate interpretive referents, what 
does determine the meaning of the constitutional text? Here our sec-
ond axiom comes into play. 
4. On filling the "god-term," see KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 110 (1969). 
5. "The framers' opinions [as to the text's meaning] .•. are both unknowable and, as they 
themselves thought, irrelevant." Ronald Dworkin, The Reagan Remlution and the Supreme 
Court, N.Y. REV. BooKs, July 18, 1990, at 23. Consider this apt rejoinder: "The claim as 
summarized is sufficiently remarkable, for if the framers' opinions are unknowable, how do we 
know they considered them irrelevant; and if their opinions are irrelevant, why should we care 
what they thought about their opinions?" Steven Knapp, Practice, Purpose, and Interpretive 
Controversy, in PRAGMATISM JN LAW AND SOCIETY 323, 340 (Michael Brint & William Weaver 
eds., 1991). 
6. See Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945 (1990); Michael S. Moore, A 
Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, SB S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985). 
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II. AsSERTION NUMBER Two: THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT CHANGES BECAUSE PEOPLE 
DISAGREE ABOUT WHAT THE TEXT MEANS 
391 
This claim is, on its face, nothing less than bizarre. How does it 
differ from the claim that "the height of Mount Everest changes be-
cause people disagree about its height?" Unless one subscribes to 
something along the lines of an extreme Berkeleian idealism, 7 or to the 
crudest sort of pragmatism - that is, the notion that the truth of a 
matter is by definition identical with beliefs about the truth of a matter 
- it is hard to understand how anyone could even entertain such a 
view. Clearly some alternative characterization of the claim is 
necessary. 
How must "the meaning of the text" differ from "the height of 
Mount Everest" so as to make our second axiom less absurd? The 
height of Mount Everest is an empirically verifiable fact, of a kind 
which necessarily remains external to the observer. 8 Disagreement 
concerning that fact does not alter its status as such. It would seem, 
then, that "the meaning of the text" would have to be a different kind 
of fact, if we are to make our second axiom intelligible. 
Suppose we were to agree that what we meant by "the height of 
Mount Everest" was "the opinion of A concerning the height of 
Mount Everest," when A is anyone who is duly authorized to have an 
opinion on the subject. Suppose further that at time Tl, X and only X 
is authorized to have an opinion concerning the question, while at time 
T2, Y and only Y is so authorized.9 If X and Y disagree about the 
mountain's height, then under these conditions it would make sense to 
say that, in this special sense, Mount Everest's height differed at T2 
from what it was at Tl. 
We can now intelligibly recharacterize the claim about the mean-
ing of the constitutional text. If the text means what the interpreter 
thinks it means, then interpretive disagreement would, by definition, 
cause changes in textual meaning. If I interpret the phrase "cruel and 
unusual punishments" to include capital punishment, then it does. If 
you interpret those words to allow executions, then they do. The 
7. See GEORGE BERKELEY, A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN 
KNOWLEDGE (Colin M. Turbayne ed., 1970) (Dublin 1710). 
8. By contrast, the observer's belief about the height of Mount Everest is a psychological fact 
and therefore internal to the observer - although it too, of course, remains subject to empirical 
verification. 
9. If n number of persons are simultaneously authorized to have such an opinion, then at any 
given time Mount Everest may exhibit n number of heights. Analogies to certain questions of 
constitutional interpretation will no doubt suggest themselves to more skeptically inclined 
readers. 
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meaning of a text can change because people disagree about its mean-
ing if and only if we assume that the different beliefs about the text's 
meaning which constitute this disagreement also constitute that 
meaning. 
Indeed, several contemporary constitutional theorists have advo-
cated this account of interpretation. From this "reader response" per-
spective, the meaning of the constitutional text is equivalent to some 
interpretive community's beliefs about the text's meaning. 10 But 
whether or not a theorist holds this position explicitly is less important 
than the fact that anyone who subscribes to the view that the meaning 
of the constitutional text changes must either accept some version of it 
or be placed in the untenable position of the theorist who holds that 
the actual height of Mount Everest alters in response to the plurality 
of beliefs that exist on that particular question. 
The "reader response" version of the second axiom thus both saves 
it from absurdity and renders the first axiom intelligible. It has, how-
ever, disastrous consequences for the third axiom. 
III. AsSERTION NUMBER THREE: INTERPRETIVE DISAGREEMENT 
Is OFTEN DESIRABLE BECAUSE JUDGES MAKE INTERPRETIVE 
MISTAKES, AND DISAGREEMENT HELPS DISTINGUISH ERRONEOUS 
INTERPRETATIONS FROM CORRECT ONES 
"Interpretive disagreement" has recently undergone intellectual 
gentrification and been transformed into the valorized concept of "dia-
logue." 11 The idea is that disagreement about what the Constitution 
means creates a dialogic dynamic which allows the text to "evolve" as 
a "living Constitution," and that this process of evolution thereby 
helps eliminate erroneous interpretations. 
This vision of interpretive conflict - which improbably combines 
animism, social Darwinism, and a dash of Hegel via the hermeneutics 
of Gadamer12 - is perhaps the most crucial element in the belief sys-
tems of progressive constitutional theorists. Surely, these progressive 
10. See, e.g., Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
1993). 
The interpretation thesis, properly understood, frees us of the illusion not so much that a 
text has only one meaning, but rather that it is the text itself, rather than the community of 
readers, that determines its meaning. The point of the interpretation thesis, then, is [that] 
... the meaning of a text may be fully determined, but if so, it is determined by institutional, 
professional, or cultural attributes of the community of its interpreters, rather than by the 
text itself. 
Id. 
11. Good examples are provided by ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 
(1992), and Friedman, supra note 1, at 655-80. 
12. I describe the unfortunate influence of Gadamer's work on American legal theory in 
Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire, supra note 2, at 1068-73. 
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thinkers argue, the Constitution must "grow" through an evolutionary 
process of "interpretation." If it did not, what hope would remain for 
achieving the one sacred goal of all secular politics - progress?13 The 
dynamic process which helps formulate the interpretation of our fun-
damental charter works properly, then, when mistaken textual inter-
pretations give way to correct - or, at least, less mistaken -
interpretations, thereby helping transform the meaning of the constitu-
tional text into the best it can be.14 
It is difficult to convey adequately the fundamental incoherence of 
this account. We have seen that, if interpreters hold the constitutional 
text's meaning to change, this change can only take place on the as-
sumption that the interpreters' beliefs determine what the text's mean-
ing actually is. But if what the interpreter thinks the text means 
determines the meaning of a text, it then involves the purest sort of 
logical contradiction to imagine that an interpreter could produce a 
mistaken interpretation. 
How could it ever be possible, on this account, for a judge (or any-
one else) to "get things wrong?" 15 Note that the reader-response ac-
count of interpretation does not preclude some interpretations from 
being more desirable than others; it merely eliminates the possibility of 
criticizing any interpretation on the grounds that it is an incorrect 
interpretation. 
For example, suppose I like cheeseburgers. Although you can, of 
course, deplore this preference - cheeseburgers destroy the rain for-
ests, cause heart disease, and so forth - it would be very strange for 
you to do so on the grounds that I did not actually like cheeseburgers. 
Yet, such a claim is precisely analogous to the position of constitu-
tional law scholars who proclaim at one and the same time that the 
meaning of the constitutional text changes, that this change is pro-
duced through interpretation, and that it is still possible to produce a 
mistaken interpretation of the constitutional text. 
But the reader-response approach to interpretation is even more 
confused than this objection implies: for if a text means what its 
reader thinks the text means, it becomes impossible to give an even 
minimally coherent description of what interpretation actually in-
volves. Recall the example of Mount Everest's height. Suppose we 
recharacterize "the height of Mount Everest" as meaning "how high X 
13. A perfect example of this mentality is President Clinton's statement about Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg: "[Clinton] said he expected [Ginsburg] to move the court neither to the 'right' nor the 
'left,' but 'forward.' " Joan Biskupic, Senate, 96-3, Approves Ginsburg as 107th Supreme Court 
Justice, WASH. Posr, Aug. 4, 1993, at A4. 
14. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-38 (1986). 
15. Friedman, supra note 1, at 652. 
394 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:388 
thinks Mount Everest is." I ask X to reveal the height of Mount Ever-
est. X responds that he does not have this information. I then ask X 
to interpret the relevant evidence in order to acquire the information 
he lacks, so that he can enlighten me as to the truth of the matter. X 
replies that he has no idea what to do next. I proceed to reassure X 
that his ignorance presents no problem because whatever belief he has 
on the subject is, by definition, the correct answer to my question. 
Note the paradoxical situation that Xis now in. What fact is he sup-
posed to discover in order to form the belief that will provide the an-
swer to his interpretive conundrum? By hypothesis, the only fact that 
counts is a fact that does not, and indeed cannot, exist. For if X already 
has a belief as to the height of Mount Everest, then he is no longer in 
the position of an interpreter: that is, there is nothing for him to inter-
pret in order to acquire the necessary belief, because he already has 
that belief. On the other hand, if he really needs to interpret, if he 
really must acquire a belief about this particular fact - that fact being 
"how high X thinks Mount Everest is" - then there is quite literally 
nothing for him to do because the particular fact he must discover in 
order to acquire the appropriate belief concerning the height of Mount 
Everest can only be acquired if he has already acquired it. 
Now defenders of reader-response theory will surely claim that this 
account is nothing but a caricature of their actual views. Such readers 
will insist that textual meaning is generated not by an interpretive 
community's discovery of its beliefs about the meaning of a text, but 
rather through the community's acquisition of beliefs about what it 
takes to be the actual meaning of the text - a meaning which the 
interpretive community, if it is to undertake interpretation at all, must 
believe is independent of its beliefs about that meaning. 
But this response is simply evasive. The fundamental question re-
mains: what fact is the interpretive community attempting to dis-
cover? To answer "the meaning of the text" merely begs the question. 
Yet if the reader-response theorist does point to some adequately spec-
ified fact, rather than to the interpretive community's beliefs about 
that fact, then the question becomes, why is that fact itself not the 
correct answer to the community's interpretive question? 
The reader-response account of interpretation thus generates both 
logical and psychological absurdities: such an account requires inter-
preters either to have already interpreted the text in order to interpret 
it or to adopt an arbitrary and irrational preference in favor of 
whatever interpretive mistakes they happen to make. If one rejects 
reader-response theory, however, the assumption that the meaning of 
a text can change through its interpretation results in the obvious em-
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pirical absurdity of such statements as "the height of Mount Everest 
changes because people disagree about its height."16 
How did so much recent constitutional theory come to adopt such 
a profoundly confused set of assumptions concerning the identity and 
interpretation of texts? In my view, three interrelated factors have 
been of paramount importance: an apparently unshakable allegiance 
to linguistic formalism, a wholesale failure to clarify what "interpreta-
tion" means, and a willingness to pursue largely illusionary instrumen-
tal goals to the detriment of more intellectual projects. 
The axiomatic status for a constitutional theory of formalist as-
sumptions about language is best illustrated by the almost universal 
desire to separate something called "the constitutional text" from any 
agent's intentions or beliefs concerning that linguistic artifact. No 
matter what else constitutional theorists believe - whether they advo-
cate "strict" or "moderate" originalism, or "progressive interpreta-
tion," or even an explicit reader-response theory - they are almost 
unanimous in their agreement that the autonomous language of the 
constitutional text precludes certain results.17 Hence, a twenty-seven 
year-old cannot be elected President not because the Framers intended 
otherwise, or because such a result is per se undesirable, but simply 
because the relevant piece of constitutional text is insufficiently "spa-
cious" to allow for this result. As I have argued elsewhere, 18 such 
beliefs mistakenly assume that it is some quality inherent in "the text 
itself," rather than in our interpretive assumptions about the intentions 
of the text's authors, which determines whether or not we believe a 
particular provision's meaning is "narrow" or "spacious" and there-
fore is or is not amenable to "interpretation." 
An unfortunate consequence of this mistake is constitutional the-
16. A version of the claim that the meaning of a text changes through its interpretation, 
which avoids the pitfalls of reader response-theory, goes as follows: "The meaning of a legal text 
does not change per se, yet the functional meaning of a legal text must be understood to be what 
an authoritative interpreter says about that meaning. Hence a legal text's functional meaning 
may change, although its true meaning does not." This is indeed a plausible account of constitu-
tional interpretation. The problem for progressive constitutional theorists remains that they have 
no plausible account of the ontology of the textual entity containing the "true meaning" that 
would enable such functional (mis)interpretation. 
17. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1987). 
Arguments from text play a universally accepted role in constitutional debate. . . . 
Where the text speaks clearly and unambiguously - for example, when it says the President 
must be at least thirty-five years old - its plain meaning is dispositive. Where the text is 
ambiguous or vague, other sources are consulted as guides to textual meaning. 
Id. Fallon's inclusion of the "framers' intent" as one of those "other sources" underscores the 
axiomatic status of textual autonomy for constitutional theorists. 
18. See generally Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, supra note 2; Campos, That Ob-
scure Object of Desire, supra note 2. 
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ory's failure to recognize the essential inadequacy of a definition of 
"the text" which limits its identity to a particular set of marks. If a 
text is identical with the marks that encode it, then "interpretation" 
will come to mean whatever we can plausibly do with or to those same 
marks. Such a definition is extremely problematic for many reasons, 
not the least of which being that, as modem literary theory has 
demonstrated, the answer to the question of what we can plausibly do 
with or to a particular set of marks is: (almost) anything. 19 
Thus the formalist assumption that at least part - and often all -
of the meaning of a text is determined through the application of the 
rules of language to a particular set of marks leads directly to constitu-
tional theory's failure to specify adequately what is meant by "inter-
pretation." Because the rules of language are by themselves such 
obviously inadequate tools for determining textual meaning, "interpre-
tation" has come to signify whatever can be done to "texts" (marks) 
when the rules of language run out. And because this spacious cate-
gory includes such things as determining what the author intended;20 
failing to determine what the author intended;21 attempting to deter-
mine what the author(s) would have intended if he, she, or they knew 
what we know, or believed what we believe;22 confusing the author 
with the reader;23 ignoring the author to the extent necessary to under-
take textual "rehabilitation";24 misreading the author so as to make 
his text the best it can be,25 or, conversely, the worst it can be;26 as well 
as many variations on these and other "interpretive methods," it is 
hardly surprising that so little has been gained in the course of consti-
tutional theory's obsessive and interminable analysis of all these phe-
nomena under the single rubric of "interpretation. "27 
19. A classic literary-critical demonstration of the protean malleability of linguistic signs is 
provided in STANLEY FISH, How To Recognize a Poem When You See One, in Is THERE A TEXT 
IN THIS CLASS? 322 (1980). 
20. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). 
21. Id. 
22. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
23. See West, supra note 10. 
24. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988). 
25. See DWORKIN, supra note 14. 
26. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987). 
27. See Suzanna Sherry, An Originalist Understanding of Minimalism, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 1993). 
Dare I suggest that we stop talking about judicial review and theories of interpretation? 
This symposium celebrates one hundred years of scholarship on judicial review and the 
manner in which it ought to be exercised, and we are no further than [when] we started. 
The debates are still as unresolved, and as rancorous, as they have ever been. 
Id. 
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To return to the question with which we began: how do we ac-
count for this unfortunate state of affairs? Among legal academics, 
whenever I have argued for the view that, as a descriptive matter, the 
meaning of a text is always what its authors intended it to mean and 
that claims that the constitutional text's meaning can change are based 
on a fundamental misunderstanding, someone will invariably ask, "but 
what about Brown v. Board of Education?" Now on one level this is a 
pretty strange question. The implication that, in 1993, any legal aca-
demic's views on textual interpretation could have any relevance to, let 
alone an effect on, the social issues dealt with in Brown is one that 
strikes this legal academic as fairly preposterous. 28 
But on another level the question makes perfect sense. The self-
images of contemporary legal academics, and especially those of con-
stitutional theorists, are, with very few exceptions, relentlessly norma-
tive.29 If you imagine that your job is - or if your sense of self 
consists of - being a person who tells the Supreme Court exactly 
what our fundamental law requires, any lines of inquiry which might 
suggest that the social practice called "constitutional interpretation" is 
a deeply confused and essentially incoherent enterprise will tend to be 
dismissed out of hand. Legitimation anxiety takes over, and some-
thing akin to the following syllogism represses the impulse toward 
critical thought: 
(1) -- (the theorist's sacred cow) was correctly decided. 
(2) The "original meaning" of the relevant constitutional provision is 
at odds with this result, therefore 
(3) the meaning of that provision has grown or evolved or been altered 
dynamically through ... "interpretation." 
Perhaps if constitutional theorists opened themselves up to the 
therapeutic insight that neither the Supreme Court nor any other 
player on the fields of state action is paying much attention to their 
Herculean exertions in the service of "the justice-seeking Constitu-
tion,"30 they could develop more of an interest in certain radically un-
derinvestigated questions. To name only one: if a social practice is 
deeply confused and fundamentally incoherent, does that necessarily 
imply that there is something wrong with it? 
28. For a careful argument that the Brown decision itself had relatively little influence on the 
social problems it addressed, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS 
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
29. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere To Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990). 
30. See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitu-
tional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993). 
